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PRAGMATISM'S ROLE IN INTERPRETATION
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK*

Although the title of this panel is in the conjunctiveOriginalism and Pragmatism-people usually assume that we
must choose originalism or pragmatism. Pragmatists, such as
Justice Breyer and Judge Posner, think it both wise and appropriate to change constitutional norms to serve modem needs.1
Pragmatists differ from Justice Douglas and other inventionists
by giving the political branches what they view as healthy
sway, through a Dworkin-like process that treats judges as authors of chain novels. 2 The pragmatist is constrained by what
earlier authors have done-but like the inventionists the modem pragmatists insist that in the end how much sway to allow
is a question for judges, because judges write today's chapter.
Originalists, such as Justice Thomas, deny that the Constitution
has changed since its words were adopted; political society
evolves informally and incrementally, but legal texts are fixed
unless the rules for change (such as statutory or constitutional
amendments) have been followed.
I want to defend the assumption of the panel's title-that
both originalism and pragmatism play vital roles in constitutional practice.
The case for pragmatism is easy to state. Our Constitution is
old, and modem society faces questions that did not occur to
those who lived during the Civil War and penned the reconstruction amendments, let alone those who survived the Revolu* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, The Law School, The University of Chicago. This brief Essay is © 2005, 2008
by Frank H. Easterbrook.
1. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OuR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION

(2005); RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK (2008).
2. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 228-38 (1986).
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tionary War and wrote the Constitution of 1787. What's more,
originalism requires us to understand how the linguistic community that approved the words understood their application. A
phrase such as "due process of law" or "commerce among the
several states" is so much noise unless linked to the original interpretive community. But language is a social and contextual
enterprise; those who live in a different society and use language
differently cannot reconstruct the original meaning except by
feats of scholarship and cerebration. More often, alas, unsupported and hubristic assertion takes the place of hard work.
New problems pose unanswerable questions to someone
who thinks originalism the sole method of interpretation. Denying the obvious gives textualism a bad name. And we have
had "new" problems from the start: think for example of the
Bank of the United States. When James Madison first considered
the Bank's constitutional status (while he was in the House) he
thought it beyond the new national government's powers; on
second take Madison (as President) signed the bill establishing
the Second Bank; and then Andrew Jackson vetoed the bill establishing the Third Bank, issuing a veto message that still repays reading. None of what Madison, Jackson, and their
contemporaries did or said was encoded in 1787; most problems lack original solutions. So much is inevitable; the Constitution is a very short document.
But no one who had a hand in creating this nation was so
foolish as to think that all interesting decisions are encoded in
the original text. The decision was to create a federal republic
and let the people work out, through their representatives, the
problems of time still to come. We do so pragmatically. How
else does democracy work?
When the Bank came to the Supreme Court in McCulloch, the
Justices approved that process. The Bank's opponents pointed
to two things: the Constitution creates limited federal powers,
and nothing authorizes the national government to create
financial intermediaries. To charter a bank Congress needed to
rely on the power to enact laws "necessary and proper" to put
the other powers into effect. But how could the Bank be "necessary"? The nation could survive without a central bank; between
1810 and 1816 it did (and would again between 1836 and 1913).

No. 3]

Pragmatism'sRole in Interpretation

By taking "necessary" strictly, the Court could have set itself up
as a potent political force, reviewing the wisdom of laws.
The Court resisted. Chief Justice Marshall explained:
Among the enumerated powers, we do not find that of establishing a bank or creating a corporation. But there is no
phrase in the instrument which, like the articles of confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers; and which
requires that every thing granted shall be expressly and minutely described.... A constitution, to contain an accurate
detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will
admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried
into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code,
and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It
would probably never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should
be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor
ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from
the nature of the objects themselves. That this idea was entertained by the framers of the American constitution, is not
only to be inferred from the nature of the instrument, but
from the language.... It is also, in some degree, warranted
by their having omitted to use any restrictive term which
might prevent its receiving a fair and just interpretation. In
considering this question, then, we must never forget, that it
3
is a constitution we are expounding.
There is that famous phrase: "we must never forget, that it is a
constitution we are expounding." But now you see its context: as
a description of legislative latitude. Marshall was explaining
why the political branches have power to act pragmatically,
while judges do not! He had two theories of constitutional
authority-one for Congress, which wields explicit grants of
power, and the other for judges. It should hardly be necessary to
remind you that there is a real Necessary and Proper Clause, but
no judicial review clause.
Congress and the President derive authority from election,
and they act under open-ended grants designed for an indefinite future. If a court is to do anything other than bless the
3. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406-07 (1819).
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product of the political branches, it must appeal to concrete decisions. Remember the rationale of Marbury v. Madison:4 the
Constitution is a set of laws, superior to statutes; having deciphered the meaning of both judges need only apply standard
choice-of-law principles. Marbury depicts the Constitution as a
catalog of rules, with a meaning comprehensible to all who
take the trouble to read carefully. When judges can reach such
a firm conclusion, they may insist that the political outcome
yield. That is the originalist constraint. Otherwise judges must
respect politically pragmatic decisions.
Thus originalism is the tool of the judicial branch-not because it is the only right way to understand texts, not because it
is easy, and certainly not because those who apply it will always be right, but because it is the only approach that explains
why judges have the final word. When an issue lacks an original answer, the premise of judicial review is defeated. When
originalism fails, so does judicial power to have the final say.
And democracy remains.
Let us not lose sleep over a claim that this leaves a "wooden"
Constitution or rule by a dead hand. Originalism is an approach
to the allocation of power over time and among the living. Decisions of yesterday's legislatures (and the 109th Congress is as
"dead" for this purpose as the 50th or the 10th) are enforced not
only because our political system does not treat texts as radioactive (there is no legal half-life) but also because affirming the
force of old texts is essential if sitting legislatures are to enjoy
the power to make new ones. Our rules for making law were
encoded in 1787 and are no more or less dead than other aspects of the process.
To say that "the dead" govern through originalism is word
play. We the living enforce laws (and the Constitution that
provides the framework for their enactment and enforcement)
that were adopted yesterday because it is wise for us to do so
today. Old texts prevail not because their authors want, but
because the living want. This isn't a theory of interpretation but
of political legitimacy. Originalists accept the Constitution's
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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theory of political obligation, but it is important to separate the
theory of political justification from the theory of interpretation
5
appropriate to that theory of justification.
The fundamental theory of political legitimacy in the United
States is contractarian, which implies originalist interpretation
by the judicial branch. Otherwise a pack of tenured lawyers is
changing the deal, reneging on behalf of a society that did not
appoint them for that purpose. This is not a controversial
proposition. It is sound historically: the Constitution was designed and approved like a contract. It is sound dispositionally:
it is the political theory the man in the street supplies when he
appeals to the Constitution (or to the legitimacy of the electoral
process, even though his candidate lost).
Contractual rights are inherited. If I buy a house with borrowed
money, the net value of the house is what my heirs inherit; they
can't get the house free from the debt. This is so whether my
heirs consent to the deal or not; contract rights pass to the next
generation as written.
Both private and social contracts are hard to change, but only
someone distracted by babble about "contracts of adhesion"
would think this an objection rather than a benefit. We the living accept the power of contract because they are hard to
change. Stability in a political system is exceptionally valuable.
Someone who loses a legislative battle today accepts that loss
in exchange for surety that next year's victory on some other
subject will be accepted by other losers in their turn. People
accept old contracts and old legal texts because they know that
this is the only way to ensure that promises to them are kept; if
all is up for grabs, they are apt to lose both coming and going.
The constitutional contract is no more hypothetical than the
losers' willingness to accept the election results today, in the
belief that they may win tomorrow. Today's majority accepts
limits on its own power in exchange for greater surety that its
own rights will be respected when, sometime in the future,
5. I flesh out this line of argument in Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation,
57 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2004); Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1119 (1998); The State of Madison's Vision of the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328 (1994);
and Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349 (1992).
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power has shifted. An originalist system of interpretation facilitates and guarantees this allocation of power over time, and
across groups.
Like other judges, I took an oath to support and enforce both
the laws and the Constitution. That is to say, I made a promisea contract. In exchange for receiving power and long tenure I
agreed to limit the extent of my discretion. Sneering at the oath
is common in the academy, but it was an important part of Chief
Justice Marshall's account of judicial review in Marbury and matters greatly to conscientious public officials. It should matter to
everyone. Would you surrender power to someone who can be
neither removed from office nor disciplined, unless that power
was constrained? The constraint is the promise to abide by the
rules in place-yesterday's rules, to be sure, but rules.
Originalism is the constraint for judges, as short tenure is the
main constraint for political officials. These different constraints
imply different modes of interpretation -just as judges under
Chevron6 give politically accountable agencies more interpretive
leeway than the judges allow themselves. 7
My point is simple. Meaning depends on the purpose to
which we put it. Judges seek the core of meaning within which
further debate is ruled out. That core will be smaller than the
scope of all constitutional interests and proprieties. In the end,
the power to countermand the decisions of other governmental
actors and punish those who disagree depends on a theory of
meaning that supposes the possibility of right answers.
You can't view rules of interpretation as unitary. You must
search for a norm simultaneously suited to the Constitution and
to the actor's role-and judges fill roles different from political
actors. We must demand not that the courts' interpretive norm
conform to the reader's political theory, but that it be law.

6. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
7. I expand on this in Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L.
REV. 1 (2004).

